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The idea of corporate culture has recently generated widespread interest
and attention from both professional practitioners and organizational researchers.!

These writers have studied and hypothesized about issues includ-

ing the origins of culture, its dissemination within organizations, its management, and how to achieve cultural change.

The purpose of this paper is to

propose a potentially useful way for classifying cultures based on a study of
their reward systems.

According to Trice and Beyer, corporate cultures have

two basic components:

(1) their substance, consisting of the network of mean-

ings contained in their values and norms, and (2) their forms, consisting of
the practices whereby cultural meanings are communicated to organization members.2

Our underlying premise is that an organization's reward system repre-

sents an essential form through which the organization communicates the substance of its culture.

By articulating desired behaviors and attitudes, the

reward system communicates its culture to new members and affirms its culture
for older ones.

The reward system thus functions as a primary instrument for

acculturation and control by transmitting values and norms to its members.

By

studying the values embedded within reward systems, we believe basic similarities and differences in corporate cultures can be categorized and compared.

THE CONCEPT OF CULTURE
The concept of culture has been defined and applied in a wide variety of
settings.

A number of disciplines have found it useful in understanding the

behavior of people in social settings.

Within this diverse literature, we

have been able to identify three elements common to definitions of culture.
First, it seems widely agreed that culture consists primarily of a set of
cognitive reference points.

Aggregated, these reference points form a frame-

work within which organization members can interpret and attribute meaning to
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their own behavior, the behavior of their group or organization, and to environmental events.

Sathe describes culture as a group's shared understandings

or assumptions about the world and how it works.3

Pettigrew views culture as

a system of publicly and collectively accepted meanings operating for a social
group at a given point in time.4

Following Sethia and Von Glinow, we define

culture as the shared and relatively enduring pattern of values, beliefs and
assumptions that allows people to attribute meaning to an otherwise meaningless flow of events.S
Second, this system of meaning gives rise to a network of values, norms,
and behavioral expectations that simultaneously derives from and supports a
culture.

As Louis has pointed out, corporate culture provides a vehicle for

an organization's continuity, control, identity, and integration.6

The sta-

bility of shared values across generations of organizational participants provides continuity and serves a homeostatic function.

This stability also

serves to detect and control deviance from the commonly-held set of organizational beliefs.
Third, cultures are expressed through a variety of symbolic, interpersonal, and structural manifestations.

These include a group's internal lan-

guage or jargon,7 rituals and ceremonial events,8 metaphors,9 stories and
legends,lO and its formal structure.ll

Because these are visible artifacts of

culture, they are the means by which culture is transmitted to members.
are also considered to

~

They

leverage points through which a culture can be modi-

fied by managers.12
REWARD SYSTEMS AS EXPRESSIONS OF CULTURE
Many of the above mentioned artifacts of culture can be traced -t o the
_practices by which rewards are allocated within a group or organization.
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Kilmann, Schein, and others have argued that much of the substance of culture
is concerned with the relationship between the organization and the individual.l3

Reward systems articulate this relationship by structuring the terms

of exchange.l4

On

the one hand, the reward system expresses the values and

norms to which those in the organization are expected to conform.

On the

other hand, it expresses the organizational response individuals can expect to
receive based on their behaviors.

Kilmann argues that culture is an expres-

sion of what the organization values and which aspects of performance are
critical to an individual's "getting ahead."l5

Implicit in the notion of cul-

ture, in other words, is the idea of performance criteria and contingent rewards, the essential elements of any reward system.

Reward systems serve as a

guide to an organization's culture first, by specifying the contributions expected from members, and second, by specifying the inducements offered by the
organization.
There are numerous examples of the interdependence between cultures and
reward systems.

Lawler notes that reward systems lead to perceptions and be-

liefs about what an organization stands for, believes in, and values.l6

Thus,

the well-known pink cadillacs and mink coats used by Mary Kay to reward top
performers are ceremonial rituals that vividly express the company's optimistic, achieving culture.

The highly quantitative and precise performance mea-

surement system at Pepsico is an equally clear expression of that firm's competitive and aggressive culture.

By contrast, the paternalistic, "family"-

like cultures of such organizations as J. C. Penney and United Press International are accurately captured in reward systems that pay off for loyalty,
tenure, and conformity to norms rather than for financial results.

While

there may be a gap between an organization's publicly espoused values and
those that actually operate on a daily basis, organization members are rarely
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misled.

The reward system -

equivocal statement of

who gets rewarded and why -

the ~ organization's

represents an un-

true values and culture.

In addition, we recognize that a large corporation with divisions in several different businesses, such as W. R. Grace or Gulf & Western, may have
multiple reward systems.

While these reward systems might share some funda-

mental philosophies and values across divisions, each division may need to
have a somewhat different reward sys'tem to fit its unique setting, business
strategy, and product's life cycle.

This raises the possibility of multiple

reward systems supporting multiple cultures or subcultures within an organization.
Subcultures are a natural byproduct of the tendency of organizations to
differentiate.

As organizations grow with respect to the number of products,

services, and divisions, subcultures can emerge that reflect a number of distinct work and social environments.

Through increasing differentiation, op-

portunity for the emergence of countercultures is also increased.
tures are shared values and beliefs
terns of the dominant culture.

T

tha~

Countercul-

are in direct conflict with the pat-

To the extent that the organization's reward

· system reinforces these distinct behavioral norms and belief systems, subcultures and countercultures are likely to be articulated and even nurtured.
The close interdependence of reward systems and cultures means that manipulation of rewards provides a mechanism for effecting culture change.

Re-

ward systems are especially useful in this role because they can be designed
to express both the direction and intensity of behaviors desired by top management.l7

We would predict that a consensus regarding the organization's re-

ward system would itself promote some sharing of beliefs and behavioral patterns.

For consensus to lead to a high level of shared beliefs and behaviors,

a strong connection between expectations, rewards, and behaviors must exist.
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METHOD
To explore the relationship between corporate cultures and reward systems
in detail, we studied the reward systems of 14 companies in the northeast and
midwest regions of the United States.

All but one of the companies were in-

cluded in Fortune's listing of the top 500 corporations for 1981.
ranged from $125 million to over $8 billion.

Sales

The companies ranged from

single-product industrial firms to multi-divisional conglomerates.
Initial contact in each firm was made with the ranking human resource
manager.

These individuals participated as key informants and provided the

names and titles of other managers in their firms who might be willing to participate.

To insure the selection of knowledgeable managers, we asked that

only persons who had been with the company for at least five years and had
participated in the distribution of rewards (e.g., salary increases, bonuses,
perquisites) be included.

In addition, at least one

mana~er

in each firm was

of sufficient rank to be responsible for making reward allocation decisions
regarding subordinates.

In other words, both sides of the reward relation-

ship, manager and subordinate, were represented in the sample.
In all, 75 interviews with high-level managers were conducted.

The in-

terviews lasted from one hour in length to as long as five or six hours.

The

average interview was approximately 90 minutes long and took place in the manager's office.

We interviewed on average 5 managers from each firm, with as

many as 10 managers in one firm.

The interviewee group included five chief

executive officers, seven group-level executives, five line vice presidents
(manufa~turing,

production), six staff vice presidents, 25 division general

managers, and 27 director-level managers.
Initial interviews in each firm concentrated on gathering objective data
on the managerial reward system.

These focused on performance definition and
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evaluation, feedback processes, and the administration of rewards (bonus,
salary, stock, perquisites, and promotion).

These interviews were structured

in order to obtain comparable data from each firm.

Later interviews concen-

trated on gathering subjective data on the firm's history, founders or dominant leaders, traditions, values, and norms.

These interviews were necessari-

ly open-ended and exploratory.
In addition to interview data, company documents, such as annual reports,
10-K reports and company histories (when available) were also examined.
firms were able to provide documentation on the reward system itself.

Some
The 10-

K and annual reports served as a basis for providing the researchers with an
overview of the firm's products, corporate and business strategy, and past
economic performance.

The company histories provided insight into the origins

of the firm, including their stated values and traditions.

Data from these

sources served as a check on the information gathered through the
interviews.18
REWARD SYSTEMS
From these key informant interviews, two distinct reward systems emerged:
the hierarchy-based system and performance-based system.

The reward systems

in eight firms were classified as hierarchy-based and six were classified as
performance-based.

The descriptions of each of these reward systems and the

cultures embedded within them are presented below.

It should be noted that

these descriptions of reward systems and cultures are composites that represent "pure" types.

Actual systems and cultures exhibited distinctive varia-

tions but conformed to the general types described below.
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The Hierarchy-Based Reward System
In hierarchy-based reward systems, the influence of superiors in defining
and evaluating the performance of subordinate managers was paramount.
mance was defined qualitatively as well as quantitatively.

Perfor-

Nonquantifiable

aspects of the subordinate's role were sometimes considered to be more imporSuperiors were free to emphasize those aspects

tant than quantifiable ones.

of the managers' role they believed to be important.

Working under one supe-

rior could entail emphasizing a different set of factors than working for
another.
Manager's jobs were broadly and subtly defined.

Managers were account-

able for how they managed their interpersonal relationships as well as the
consequences of their actions.

Numbers (e.g., ROI) did not tell the whole

story and more subtle aspects of performance were sometimes viewed as the most
important.

Superiors were critical to subordinate managers' career mobility

and succsess with the firm.

Superiors were the source of training, socializa-

tion, feedback, and rewards.

They were to be studied, emulated, and satisfied

if subordinates expected to succeed.
Superiors interpreted the performance of subordinates according to their
own subjective criteria.

Even in quantified areas of subordinates' roles, su-

periors did not hesitate to interpret numerical outcomes in the context of
their own knowledge of the situation.

Factors such as interdivisional cooper-

ation, long-term relations with customers, leadership style, and development
of junior managers were evaluated despite obvious difficulties in quantifying
them.

This type of evaluation communicated the importance of the hierarchy

and the subordinate's dependence on superiors.

The subjective nature of

evaluation allowed for the inclusion of qualitative performance criteria and
reinforced the message that a manager must be concerned with more than just
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the numbers.

Subjective evaluation permitted consideration of the long-term

consequences of managerial action.

This implied an ongoing commitment to the

activity or business in question.
Formal performance appraisals took place once a year.
however, was quite frequent.
superiors and subordinates.

Informal feedback,

There was a high level of interaction between
Feedback occurred on the job, in the dining room,

during executive retreats, or at the country club.

Feedback was oriented more

towards employee development than towards evaluation.

Performance definition

and evaluation were subjective and, therefore, the quality of a subordinate's
performance could only be known through superiors.

The high level of interac-

tion coupled with a developmental approach communicated the organization's
commitment to the individual's success and future.

This was conducive to men-

taring relationships and to extensive socialization of younger managers.

The

sense of dependency and vulnerability to the judgments of superiors was
balanced by a message of concern for the individual as a valued resource whose
development was important to the organization.
A manager's bonus was based on corporate performance.
warded the team, not the individual manager.

The system re-

All gained or lost together.

This promoted a sense of reciprocal interdependence and provided a basic rationale for cooperative rather than competitive behavior.

The fact that po-

tential bonus payouts increased with hierarchical level emphasized the importance of long-term commitment to the organization (tenure was a precondition
for promotion) and conformity to its norms.

Bonus was a relatively small pro-

portion of total compensation, ranging from 20 to 30%, while salary was the
largest part of a manager's compensation.

By severely limiting potential

bonus for the indi_v idual star, the system removed the incentive for behaviors
that benefited single managers rather than the entire organization.

The bonus
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system reinforced the subordinate's dependence on superiors' judgment because
superiors determined appropriate bonus amounts.
Salary increases were generally determined through a formal salary plan
such as the Hay system.

The two major factors influencing the size of a sal-

ary increase were tenure (time in grade) and performance (subjective evaluation by superiors).
crease decision.

The tenure component provided structure to the salary in-

Policies specified the range of possible increases within

the job classifications.
Perquisites were even more constrained by policy than were raises.
Available perquisites were not necessarily elaborate.
however, were carefully policed.

Those that existed,

Status symbols, such as location of offices,

furniture, club memberships, first-class travel, etc., were considered important symbols of rank.

Superiors sometimes insisted that managers use them

even in cases where the individual did not want them.

While perquisites them-

selves symbolized rank and power for those that had them, the careful policing
of perquisites conveyed information about the importance of rank, tenure, and
commitment.

It communicated a sense of ritual and tradition.

Receiving a

particular type of desk upon promotion, being told (not asked) to join a prestigious men's club because everyone of a given rank had always done so, being
met at airports by local managers, were all rituals that told members about
the symbolic meaning of perquisites.
history and uniqueness.

They communicated a sense of tradition,

Even for those not eligible for such perquisites, the

fact that they existed provided a feeling of belonging not simply to an economic entity, but to a social and cultural system.
In contrast to perquisites, stock awards were not structured in any obvious way.

Managers had little knowledge about how or why awards were made.

Awards were not directly related to individual or even corporate performance.
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Generally, the higher the managerial rank, the greater the eligibility for
stock awards.

The absence of information about stock awards left subordinates

with no understanding of these rewards or how to influence their distribution.
The lack of clarity imparted a sense of mysterious ritual to the reward.
Again, the message was that subordinates must trust superiors to do the right
thing.

Receiving stock awards symbolized acceptance into some inner circle.

Therefore, managers had to be highly cognizant of deviations from the total
set of values and norms operating in the company.

Since the basis for stock

awards was not understood, any deviation might be serious enough to reduce or
temporarily eliminate the reward for a manager.
Promotion from within was the standard policy.

Promotions were relative-

ly frequent (every two to four years) and were often motivated more by the individual's need for development (i.e., exposure to new areas) than by the organization's need to fill a slot.

Many of these promotions did not entail

s i gnificant increases in authority, responsibility, or salary.

Commitment to

employee development and cross-fertilization resulted in lateral or diagonal
movement rather than vertical movement for many managers.
·norm regarding "cross-fertilization" in most companies.

There was a strong
Managers were rou-

tinely transferred across division or functional boundaries in keeping with
the emphasis on management development.
A norm of promotion from within provided a strong signal to members that
the organization valued long-term commitment.

These promotions symbolized

that the organization was a place where a member could pursue a lifetime
career.

This was a central clause within the implicit social contract

all

things being equal, an individual would not be passed over for someone who had
not paid dues to the organization.
already-socialized member.

It expressed a high regard

fo~

the
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The practice of cross-fertilization and freQuent lateral movement expressed concern for the development of employees.

These practices communi-

cated concern that the individual was learning about the organization and that
his or her progress and success was important.

Promotions of this type con-

tributed to a tight, homogeneous organization with common language, experience, and values.

Lack of movement signaled a disinvestment in the individual

and a loss of interest on the part of the organization.
The hierarchy-based reward system, summarized in Table 1, expressed a
number of fundamental cultural tenets.

First, this reward system provided an

Insert Table 1 About Here
unequivocal signal that hierarchical position was the source of 'p ower, resources, information, and rewards.

The hierarchy structured

or~anized

activi-

ty and provided the context within which social interaction took place.

Sec-

ond, virtually all aspects of the reward system -- from the definition and
measurement of performance to the actual determination of rewards -- was predicated on the perceptions, knowledge, and judgment of superiors.

Superiors

were the key to an individual's development, promotion, and eventual success
in the organization.

Third, the hierarchy-based reward system gave clear sig-

nals about the value of conformity.
managerial style was important.

Conforming to the dominant philosophy and

The qualitative and subjective nature of the

system communicated that conformity was also expected over a wide range of
both obvious and subtle behaviors.
Fourth, the reward system expressed the value of reciprocal interdependence.

Rewards based on group rather than individual performance promoted

feelings of a shared fate.

Frequent cross-divisional movement

ti~htened

nizational ties by creating a network of personal relationships.

orga-

Promotions
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from within and carefully policed perquisites fostered a sense of belonging to
a unique and cohesive group.
of long-term commitment.
tenure.

Finally, the reward system expressed the value

All classes of rewards increased with rank and

The reward system expressed the organization's commitment to the in-

dividual through promotion from within, cross-fertilization, and an emphasis
on employee development.
The Clan Culture
The kind of culture that emerged from the hierarchy-based reward systems
may be characterized as a clan.

Ouchi19 has used the term clan to describe a

control system based on socialization and internalized values and norms.
Table 2 summarizes the major features of the clan culture.

In this culture,

the relationship between the individual and the organization is analogous to a
Insert Table 2 About Here
fraternal group.

Each recognizes .a n obligation to the other that goes beyond

the simple exchange of labor for salary.

It ·is tacitly understood by both

parties that either may require contributions that exceed any contractual
agreements.

The individual's long-term commitment to the organization

(loyalty) is exchanged for the organization's long-term commitment to the individual (security).

This relationship is predicated on mutual interests:

the fate of the collective equates with the fate of the individual.
The clan culture accomplishes this unity through a long and thorough socialization process.
tiona!

~areer

Members progress through the ranks by pursuing tradi-

paths in the company.

Older members of the clan serve as men-

tors and role models for younger members.

It is through these relationships

that the values and norms of the firm are maintained over successive generations of managers.

The clan is aware of its unique history, often documenting
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its origins and celebrating its traditions in various ceremonies.

Statements

of its credo or publicly-held values are reinforced at these meetings.

Mem-

bers share a picture of the organization's "style," its manner of conduct.
Attitudinal and behavioral expectations exist for a broad range of situations
and activities.
In the clan culture, members share a sense of pride in the fraternity and
in membership.

The socialization process results in strong identification be-

tween members and a strong sense of interdependence.

The up-through-the-ranks

career pattern results in an extensive network of colleagues whose paths have
crossed and who have shared similar experiences.

Communication, coordination,

and integration are facilitated by shared goals, perceptions, and behavioral
tendencies.
There is also considerable pressure to conform.

The very richness of the

culture means there are few areas left totally free from normative pressures.
Whether or not fully socialized members experience these pressures as obnoxious, the culture does not usually generate risk-taking or creative initiatives.

It also does not generate a feeling of personal ownership on the part

of members for a division, product, or idea.

For this and other reasons, the

culture is not conducive to entrepreneurial activity.
The Performance-Based Reward System
Other firms exhibited another type of reward system.

This system defined

and measured performance objectively and explicitly linked rewards to performance.

In many ways, it was the polar opposite of the hierarchy-based system.

Performance was defined almost completely in terms of quantitative criteria.
Qualitative aspects of performance were generally ignored.

Specific rewards

or proportions of rewards were linked directly to specific performance criteria (e.g., X% of bonus based on return on assets, Y% of bonus on pretax
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profits, etc.).

In this way, superior managers exerted influence by objec-

tively weighting the various components of the subordinate's job.
This reward system conveyed that the manager's job was specifically defined.

A manager's divergent roles were coalesced into a few basic financial

outcomes.

Accountability was primarily for results, and not for the methods

by which results were achieved.
market share) were all important.

The message was that the numbers (e.g., ROI,
Evaluations were frequently based on a for-

mula with the manager's financial results serving as inputs.
aspects of performance were generally not evaluated.

Nonquantifiable

Because of the quantita-

tive emphasis, performance evaluation necessarily focused on the current time
frame with little consideration of future consequences.
This type of evaluation communicated to managers their independence from
the subjective judgments of their supedors.

Superiors had few channels

through which to express their concern for stylistic aspects of their subordinates' performance.

The system clearly told managers to focus on those

performance elements that could be quantified.

Because activities that con-

tribute to long-run competitiveness are sometimes difficult to quantify, this
system signaled that such activities were not formally part of the reward
equation.
Performance feedback in this group was erratic.
or more formal appraisals while others held none.

Some companies held one

Informal feedback and in-

teraction between superior and subordinate was relatively infrequent.

Feed-

back was oriented more towards evaluation than towards employee development.
Because performance was defined and measured quantitatively and objectively,
the subordinate manager was not dependent on the superior for feedback.
terpretation of performance was not necessary.
both parties by examining financial outcomes.

In-

Results could be understood by
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The low level of interaction between superior and subordinate and the
evaluative, as opposed to developmental, approach to feerlback served to emphasize the subordinate's autonomous role.

These characteristics did not express

concern for the subordinate's development or long-term career progress.

The

reward system was not conducive to a mentoring relationship, nor was it likely
to contribute to the transference of subtle norms and values.
was not an important function of this system.

Socialization

There was no need to communi-

cate a complex set of norms to young managers.
Bonuses in this system were a very significant part of compensation •
. Bonus maximums ranged from 40% of salary to "no limit."

That is, in some

firms there was no cap on what a manager could earn in bonus if the financial
criteria were met.

Bonus was based almost exclusively on the performance of

the division over which the manager had authority.

The performance of other

divisions or the entire corporation, whether better or worse, had almost no
effect on the individual's bonus.
erated its own bonus pool.
by formula.

Each division was a profit center and gen-

An individual's actual bonus payout was determined

The resulting figure was rarely altered by superiors, and was

virtually free of superiors' influence.
The bonus system communicated that the manager was an independent operator, not only in terms of superiors, but in terms of other divisions as well.
The individual's fate was independent of others.

There was no economic ra-

tionale for cooperative behavior between different divisional managers.

The

fact that divisions typically competed for corporate resources contributed to
a competitive relationship between divisional managers.

The potentially large

size of bonuses communicated the value placed on the "star" performer rather
than the team player.

Bonuses were tied to performance rather than to rank.

This de-emphasized the hierarchy as an important source of rewards.
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Salary increases and stock awards were indirectly based on managerial
performance.

Salary increases were affected by the external labor market, the

cost of living, and the manager's overall performance.

Stock arrangements
These

were frequently negotiated at the time the manager joined the company.
rewards were loosely relate-d to performance.
were determined subjectively by superiors.

Actual amounts of these rewards
While this contradicts the objec-

tive and distant nature of the system, it expressed the relatively lower value
placed on these rewards by the organization.
was conveyed in a manager's bonus.

Significant performance feedback

It is also possible that superiors operat-

ing under this system needed to have some mechanisms available to them that
expressed subjective perceptions of subordinate performance.

The relative

flexibility of salary increases and stock awards may have satisfied that
need.
Perquisites were almost nonexistent in the performance-based system.
Symbols of rank and status were not emphasized because the hierarchy itself
was not emphasized.

This communicated a sense of egalitarianism.

lessened the sense of community and uniqueness, however.

It

~lso

If reward rituals

(predicated on tenure and hierarchical position) convey the existence of an
in-group, then the absence of such rituals weakens the feeling of participation in a tradition and membership in a special group.
Promotion in this system was not governed by a norm of promotion from
within.
side.

It was common to find high-ranking managers brought in from the outMany had been with their companies only a few years.

Promotions were

generally motivated by the organization's need to fill a vacancy rather than
the individual's need for exposure.

Relative to the hierarchy-based system,

promotion_ occurred infrequently a_n d was usually vertical (i.e., within the
same division or function) rather than across unit boundaries.
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The practice of hiring from outside, as opposed to promotion from within,
conveyed to members that the organization's commitment to them was not necessarily long-term.

Individuals could be repeatedly passed over for promotion

when the organization was able to identify more attractive candidates.

These

organizations were indicating that they did not necessarily value tenure or
the socialized individual to the extent that they would not consider others
who did not possess those traits.

They also communicated that they did not

necessarily expect a long-term commitment from their members.
led to a mutually exploitive relationship.

These practices

The individual was utilized to

fill a particular role or perform a particular function, until he or she was
needed elsewhere or was replaced by a more qualified person.

This relation-

ship engendered a similar response from the individual who exploited the organizationuntil superior benefits were obtainable elsewhere.
Through the reward system, these organizations also expressed their expectations concerning desired levels of integration between divisions.

Verti-

cal promotions tended to facilitate specialization rather than the movement of
personnel across divisional boundaries.

A wide network of managers who have

worked together, know each other, and understand each other's responsibilities
was not fostered.

Instead, these promotional practices sent a message of di-

visional independence and uniqueness.

These organizations did not seek an in-

tegrated system based on shared language, norms, and goals.
The performance-based reward system may be summarized in terms of a few
basic values shown in Table 3.

First, the system fundamentally rests on the

Insert Table 3 About Here
principle of economic exchange.

The individual enters into agreement with the

organization that certain inputs will be exchanged for certain outcomes
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according to a carefully defined set of guidelines.

The reward system limits

the relationship between the two parties by specifying exactly the terms of
exchange.

Neither party will go much beyond the specified terms because nei-

ther has any assurance that the other will reciprocate at some future time.
The existence of a highly detailed contract, in other words, encourages a
legalistic relationship in which both sides adhere strictly to the contractual
terms.
Second, subordinates are highly autonomous in relation to superiors
cause they are responsible only for the specified financial results.

be~

The or-

ganization relinquishes a significant degree of control over the manager's
methods, style, and so on.

It primarily monitors ends rather than the means

managers employ in achieving them.

This also means superiors have reduced

leverage in influencing the behaviors and values of younger managers.

Norms,

values, and attitudes are more difficult to instill where the subordinate perceives little benefit- from conforming to them.
Third, the system does not constrain managers by requiring conformity to
a broad range of norms.

This is due to the fact that the evaluation process

focuses primarily on outcomes, and not on behaviors.

There are few behaviors

governed by norms, values, or implicit expectations.

In addition, the overall

objectivity of the reward system undermines the power of superiors to insist
that subordinates conform to particular practices.

Superiors, usually a crit-

ical source of values and normative influence, play a limited role as mentors
and role models under this reward system.
Fourth, the system signals the value of independence rather than interdependence.

Individual achievement is rewarded.

Little incentive exists for

sharing lines of information, resources, or personnel.

Promotional practices

reinforce divisional differences*rather than breaking them down.

Promotion
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The ab-

from outside undermines socialization, cohesion, and group identity.

sence of perquisites and other company rituals discourages a sense of tradition and uniqueness.
Finally, the performance-based system expresses a short-term orientation
based on mutual exploitation.

Quantitative performance criteria make it dif-

ficult to consider actions and decisions from a long-term perspective.

The

contractual nature of the reward system generates an "arm's length" relationship between the organization and individual.
foster loyalty or job security.

This system is not designed to

The organization's lack of concern for the

development and future of members calls forth a similar short-term commitment
from the individual.

Promotion from outside signals to members that they,

too, must continually weigh the value of external possibilities.

Infrequent

vertical promotions convey that the organization is primarily interested in
gaining maximum utility from each member rather than developing career paths.
Market Culture
Ouchi20 has used the term market to describe a system of control in which
behaviors are constrained by negotiated terms of exchange that are viewed as
equitable by the parties involved.

This characterization accurately summa-

rizes the culture embedded in the performance-based reward system.
Table 4 lists the major characteristics of the market culture.

In this

culture, the relationship between individual and organization is contractual.
Insert Table 4 About Here
Obligat~ons

of each party are specified in advance.

The individual is re-

sponsible for some minimum level of performance in return for which the organization promises to provide a given level of rewards.

Increased levels of

performance are exchanged for increased rewards as specified in a negotiated
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schedule.

Neither party recognizes the right of the other to demand more than

was originally specified.

The organization does not promise (or imply) secu-

rity; the individual does not promise (or imply) loyalty.

The contract is re-

newed annually, conditional upon each party adequately performing its obliIt is utilitarian in that each party uses the other as a means of

gations.

furthering its own goals.

Rather than promoting a feeling of membership in a

social system, the market culture encourages a strong sense of independence
and individuality in which each participant pursues his or her own interests.
Contribution to the social system is a means to an end.
The market culture does not exert a great deal of normative pressure on
its members.

Relatively few be-

First, the normative structure is lean.

haviors are governed by norms and values.

Members do not share a common set

of expectations regarding a unique style or philosophy of management.

There

is, therefore, little pressure from peers to conform to specific behaviors or
attitudes.

Superiors maintain an arm's length relationship with subordinates.

Much of a superiors' interaction with subordinates consists of negotiating
performance-reward agreements and/or evaluating requests for resource allocations.

A superior's influence on subordinate rewards is limited.

pedes his or her ability to transfer values and norms.

This im-

Superiors are less ef-

fective as role models or mentors and the absence of long-term commitment by
both parties weakens the acculturation process.
Relations between a manager's peers are at arm's length as well.

There

is no obvious economic interdependence, and therefore, no clear rationale for
cooperation or identification with peers.

Managers do not interact frequently

with counterparts in other divisions and do not develop an extensive network
of colleagues in the company.

Vertical career paths result in little under-

standing of or identification with other divisions.

Managers in a market
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culture view themselves as independent entrepreneurs, rather than as members
of a cohesive group.

There is a sense of individual ownership, with the man-

ager bearing the risks and responsibilities alone.
The market culture is not designed to generate loyalty, cooperation, or a
sense of belonging to a social system.

Members do not feel constrained by

norms, values, or allegiance to an accepted way of doing and thinking.

It

does, however, generate personal initiative, a strong sense of ownership and
responsibility for operations and decisions, and an entrepreneurial approach
to management.

The individual is free to pursue organizational goals with a

minimum of organizational constraint.
CONCLUSIONS
This paper has proposed a framework for developing a typology of organizational cultures on the basis of how reward systems are designed.

The under-

lying premise has been that managerial reward systems accurately express many
of the values, norms, and expectations that comprise an organization's culture.

Reward systems represent visible manifestations of cultures and can

serve as proxies in the identification of corporate cultures.

Reward systems

define and evaluate performance, and determine and distribute rewards.

These

are overt matnifestations of the values and norms imbedded within the corporation.
It is important to recognize that both reward systems and cultures develop within a complex organizational context of strategy, structure, and process.

A given culture and its associated reward system is neither good nor

bad, effective nor ineffective, except in terms of its support of the total
organizational system of which it is part.

Both the hierarchy-based and the

performance-based systems are "performance-based" in the sense that each
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identifies and rewards a set of more or less complex behaviors.

The differ-

ence lies in the cultural values that are expressed through the reward system.
To the extent these are congruent with strategy, structure, and process, it is
likely that reward system design will effectively contribute to organizational
goals.

Thus, while the hierarchy-based reward system fosters clan values of

loyalty, interdependence, and long-term commitment, these mpy comprise an ineffective culture in an environment that requires innovation, aggressiveness,
and a strong desire for individual achievement.

Similarly, the entrepreneur-

ialism, autonomy, and short-term focus of the market culture may be dysfunctiona! in mature, capital-intensive industries where system-wide integration
is critical.
Analysis of the differences between these two cultural types suggests
there are at least seven basic values that distinguish one culture from
another.

These are illustrated in Table 5.

Three values pertain to the

Insert Table 5 About Here

------------------------individual's relationship with the organization, two pertain to the individual's relationship with peers, and two pertain to the process by which acculturation is accomplished.

By determining where an organization falls on each

dimension, it may be possible to develop a broad profile of its culture.
Other dimensions of culture may also be identified.

A(J.dj..tional dimen,-

sions would provide a richer, more comprehensive framework with which to
analyze organizational cultures.

The resulting cultural types would be more

accurately detailed, the similarities and differences between - them more apparent.

It should then be possible to identify generic cultural types occupy-

ing intermediate positions on the various dimensions, as well as the gross
distinctions made here.
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Table 1.

Major Characteristics of the Hierarchy-Based Reward System

Performance Definition:

Qualitative criteria, subjective weighting,
not defined by strategy, not linked to
rewards;

Evaluation:

Subjective, one or two supervisors, current
and future time frame;

Feedback:

One formal session, high dependency on
superiors, frequent interaction;

Promotion:

From within, developmental, relatively
frequent, cross-fertilization;

Bonus:

Based on corporate performance and position;
objective and subjective determination;
20-30% of salary max.

Salary Increase:

Based on performance and tenure;
"objectively" determined; formal salary plan;

Perquisites:

System enforced; status emphasized;

Stock Awards:

Subjectively determined.

Table 2.

Characteristics of a Clan Culture

The relationship between individual and organization:
1.

fraternal relationship

2.

mutual long-term commitment

3.

rests on mutual interests, a shared fate

4.

sense of tradition, history, company, style

5.

hierarchy structures relationship

The relationship between organization members:
6.

pride in membership

7.

sense of interdependence, identification with peers

8.

extensive collegial network

9.

pressure from peers to conform

10.

stresses collective rather than individual initiative, ownership

The process of acculturation:
11.

long, thorough socialization

12.

superiors are mentors, role models, agents of socialization

13.

"rich" normative structure governs wide range of behaviors

Table 3.

Major Characteristics of the Performance-Based Reward System

Performance Definition:

Quantitative criteria; objective weighting;
defined by strategy; clearly linked to
performance;

Evaluation:

Objective, formulae; current time frame;

Feedback:

Low dependency on superiors; generally
infrequent interaction;

Promotion:

From within and without; organization need;
infrequent; vertical;

Bonus:

Based on division performance; objectively
determined; Max. 40% - No limit;

Salary Increase:

Based on indirect performance; subjectively
determined;

Perquisites

Non-existent; status

Stock Awards:

Subjectively determined.

de~emphasized;

Table 4.

Characteristics of a Market Culture

The relationship between individual and organization:
1.

contractual relationship

2.

mutual short-term commitment

3.

rests on self-interest, utilitarianism

4.

sense of individualism, personal style

5.

terms of exchange structure relationship

The relationship between organization members:
6.

independence from peers

7.

limited interaction

8.

little pressure from peers to conform

9.

stresses individual initiative, ownership

The process of acculturation:
10.

little socialization

11.

superiors are distant, negotiators, resource

12.

"lean" normative structure governing few behaviors

allocato~rs

Table 5.

Clan Culture
Values
1.

Fraternal
Relationship

2.

Relationshi Based on
Mutual Interests

3.

Lon -term
Commitment

4.

Interdependence

s.

Peer Pressure
Leading to Conformity

Some Basic Dimensions of Culture

Market Culture
Values
Contractual
Relationship

Relationshi Based
on Self-Interest

Short-term
Commitment

Independence

Low Level of
Peer Pressure

6. - ~~Ri~·~c~h~N_o_r_m_a_t_i_v_e._________________~----------------------~L~e-a~n__N_o_r_m_a_t_i_v_e__
Structure
Structure

7.

Thorou h
Socialization

Little
Socialization
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